Abstract U.S. companies are often criticized as overly short-term oriented. This paper documents that those criticisms have a long history, going back at least thirty-five years. The paper then considers the implications of sustained short-termism for corporate profits, venture capital investment and returns, private equity investment and returns, and corporate valuations. The paper finds little long-term evidence that is consistent with the predictions of the short-term critics
Poor corporate governance and overly generous pay plans for CEOs that reward short-term behavior are often cited as accomplices to short-termism. 3 The critics also point to empirical evidence to support their positions. For example, Graham et al. (2005) survey 401 financial executives and find that 78 percent would sacrifice long-term value to smooth earnings. Others point to corporate dividends and buybacks. Lazonick (2014) shows that S&P 500 companies paid out over 90% of their net income in dividends and share repurchases, leaving little available for investment in the long-term.
Lazonick and others contend that companies buy back their own stock to boost their share prices in the short run, regardless of the long-term impact.
These criticisms, however, are not new. They have been raised, prominently, in some form or another since the early 1980s. In this paper, I present those historical criticisms. I then consider the implications of sustained short-termism for corporate profits, venture capital investment and returns, private equity investment and returns, and corporate valuations. In fact, there is very little long-term evidence that is consistent with the predictions of the short-term critics. 4 1.
Some Short-termist History
The criticism that US companies are plagued by short-termism and poor governance has a long history. In 1980, Harvard Business School's Robert H. Hayes and William J. Abernathy wrote an influential article criticizing American companies for being too short-term oriented:
"By their preference for servicing existing markets rather than creating new ones and by their devotion to short-term returns and management by the numbers, many of them have effectively forsworn long-term technological superiority as a competitive weapon. In consequence, they have abdicated their strategic responsibilities."
Similarly, Marty Lipton wrote in 1979:
"It would not be unfair to pose the policy issue as: Whether the long-term interests of the nation's corporate system and economy should be jeopardized in order to benefit speculators interested . . . only in a quick profit . . . ?"
The argument was prominently repeated in 1992 when Harvard's Michael E. Consistent with the increase in profits, both Autor et al. (2017) and Burkai (2016) explore explanations for the strong corporate profitability and, concomitant, weak labor share of GDP.
Whatever its source, the strong profitability of U.S. corporations is difficult for the shorttermists to explain. It is obviously not consistent with poor corporate performance over the longterm. Nevertheless, short-termists continue to repeat the criticisms of the 1980s and 1990s.
It is worth adding that the strong corporate performance also is not consistent with poor corporate governance overall, suggesting that criticisms of U.S. corporate governance are overstated. This is arguably the type of example that the quote by John Stuart Mill that begins this paper had in mind. The VC fund typically has a fixed life, usually ten years, but can be extended for up to three (and often more) additional years. The VC firm normally has five years to invest the fund's committed capital into companies (and then has an additional five to eight years to return the capital to its investors). After committing capital, the LPs have little say in how the VC firm deploys the funds.
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VC firms, therefore, can make long-term investments in innovative companies with time horizons of five to ten years. If U.S. companies are overly short-term oriented, one might expect to see increased opportunities for profitable VC investment over time. What about the returns to these funds? Have VC funds earned abnormally high returns?
The short-term argument implies that VC investments should be extremely profitable. To measure VC performance, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) introduced the public market equivalent methodology that today is now known as the KS PME. The PME compares an investment in venture capital to an investment in public equities at the same amount and at the same time. This makes the PME essentially a market-adjusted multiple. Sorensen and Jagannathan (2015) provide a theoretical justification for this as an appropriate measure of venture capital performance.
Kaplan and Schoar used the S&P 500 (including dividends) as the appropriate market benchmark. More formally, the PME is calculated as: PME = Σ t (value of cash distributions to investors discounted at the S&P 500) t Σ t (value of invested capital discounted at the S&P 500) t
If the PME exceeds one, then investors in venture capital funds have outperformed the S&P 500.
Harris, Jenkinson, Kaplan (2014a and and Harris, Jenkinson, Kaplan, Stucke (2014b) study the performance of VC and private equity (PE) funds. Those papers rely on data from Burgiss that they argue provides the most accurate information on VC and PE performance.
Burgiss data set "is sourced exclusively from LPs and includes their complete transactional and valuation history between themselves and their primary fund investments." In essence, Burgiss uses the cash flow data from institutional clients who use its tools for record-keeping and performance monitoring to create "checkbook" data on cash flows. And, these performance results may overstate opportunities for two reasons.
First, Korteweg and Nagel (2015) introduce a generalized PME that provides conditions under which it is appropriate to make a different risk adjustment. In practice, the Korteweg and Nagel adjustment leads to somewhat lower estimates of VC performance.
Second, and more importantly, it is not at all clear that VC investing and performance is scalable. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) , Harris et al. (2014b) and others consistently find that the performance of the better VC firms persists, particularly when they do not increase the size of their funds. This means that the stronger VC performance tends to be concentrated in the higher performing funds. funds in any one year skew the overall average performance. This is not the case for other private equity / buyout funds. This also suggests that it is not possible to scale the VC industry and returns simply by adding more VC funding. There is likely some specialized skill or ability that is required.
In sum, it does not seem that there is systematically too little venture capital. If U.S.
companies were short-term oriented, we should have seen larger increases in VC investment and supra-normal returns. Ironically, as Kaplan and Lerner (2009) This pattern suggests that there may have been an unusual opportunity to invest offset short-termism and invest in innovation in the 1980s and 1990s. And, of course, this ascribes all PE investing as being driven by short-termism and innovation. As Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) discuss, there are other reasons why PE investors may have had opportunities.
Since 2006, however, the opportunity appears to have stabilized as the amount of money committed to PE has stabilized. If, in fact, there was an opportunity, market forces have responded to that opportunity to the point where today it has been competed away. 
Corporate Valuations
One last observation is to consider what price-earnings or P/E ratios tell us. Recall that:
Where R is the firm's or market's discount rate and g is the long-term growth rate. Now, let's decompose R -g:
where R f is the risk free rate, generally considered the long-term Treasury Bond rate; π is the expected inflation rate and RP is the equity market risk premium.
The short-term argument implies that g is lower today than in the past. Other things equal, this strongly implies that R -g should be historically high, and, therefore, P/E ratios should be historically low. Figure 7 presents a historical time series of the Shiller cyclically-adjusted price-toearnings ratio (CAPE). Rather than being historically low, P/E ratios today are historically high.
The CAPE, is currently 28.7 versus a historical median of 16.1. Similarly, the P/E ratio of the S&P 500 is roughly 25 versus a historical median of 15.
If P/E ratios are historically high, then it must follow that R -g is historically low. The current P/E ratios versus the historical medians imply that R -g has declined by almost 3%. But, short-termists argue that g, too, is historically low. For R -g to be low, some combination of the following must occur and dominate: either real risk-free rates are low: (R f -π); the risk premium is low; or the expected growth rate is high. For the short-termists to be correct, a historically low g needs to be offset by historically even lower real risk-free rates or equity risk premiums.
There is evidence that real risk-free rates have declined since the early 1980s, possibly on the order of 3%. But, there is no evidence that g has declined.
Furthermore, Arnott et al. (2015) find that P/E ratios typically decline historically when real interest rates are particularly low or high. "When inflation or real interest rates deviate from their "sweet spot"-in either direction-valuations tend to fall." This is driven by the fact that expected g usually falls a lot when inflation is low. Given the low levels of inflation and real interest rates today, the Arnott et al. (2015) model implies that P/E ratios should not be historically high. The fact that they are historically high suggests that expected g is also unusually high or that equity risk premiums are unusually low.
In other words, the current high levels of U.S. P/E ratios are not obviously consistent with the predictions of the short-term proponents. Anyone who wished to make the short-term argument, therefore, needs to also explain the high U.S. P/E ratios.
Other Observations
There are at least five other general observations that are hard to square with the shorttermism argument.
First, the late 1990s saw an unusual, if not stunning rise in the value of Internet-related stocks. Investors in the stock market over this period were willing to put extremely high values on cash flows that were expected to occur far in the future. This was consistent with very large and very long-term expected cash flows. Ex post, of course, those cash flows never occurred for many of the Internet companies, leading to the Internet bust.
Second, Ritter (2016) confirms the findings of Fama and French (2004) Fourth, the energy sector has benefited from, if not been transformed by the fracking revolution. Golden and Wiseman (2015) and Zuckerman (2013) Other pieces of evidence encourage the short-termers. For example, Graham et al (2005) survey 401 financial executives and find that 78 percent would sacrifice long-term value to smooth earnings. I have no reason to doubt that result. Corporate leaders face strong pressures, some of which may lead them to take actions that flatter the short run at the expense of the longer run. However, it is also clear that some of the same short-term pressures can actually prompt companies to become more efficient. It is not at all clear which of these effects dominates. Again, the trend line suggests that even if some companies obsess over the short run, the long run takes care of itself.
Another argument that is regularly used by those who lament short-termism relates to corporate dividends and buybacks. Lazonick (2014) shows that S&P 500 companies paid out over 90% of their net income in dividends and share repurchases, leaving little available for investment in the long-term. Lazonick and others contend that companies buy back their own stock to boost their share prices in the short run, regardless of the long-term impact.
This argument is something of a non sequitur. It suggests that in a buyback or dividend, the money simply disappears rather than going to investors who spend it or use it to make other investments. It also suggests that companies that don't need money should invest it anyway, rather than give it back to shareholders. Fried and Wang (2017) also show that the argument is overstated. When they consider equity issuance, they find that S&P 500 companies pay out on net only about 44% of their net income, not 90+%. When they consider all public companies, they find only 33% of net income is paid out on net. And when they also consider net debt issuance, the ratio declines to 22% of net income. That would hardly be a cause for concern.
For observers such as my colleague Luigi Zingales at Chicago Booth, part of the explanation is crony capitalism, in which incumbent corporate giants use their political connections to shape the system in their favor. There may be industries that fit that description-telecoms being a possible example-but I suspect they are the exception rather than the rule. The US's biggest, most valuable companies are Apple, Google, Amazon, Facebook, and the like. They have used market forces to their advantage, are profitable as a result, and certainly now enjoy some market power. But they didn't attain that position through crony capitalism.
They have gotten to where they are because they operate in sectors where there are network effects.
As noted earlier, at the same time, the short-termers ignore a lot of evidence that goes against their position. Amazon has been highly valued for many years despite the fact that it was losing money for much of that time. Amazon invested for the long run and has been richly rewarded for doing so. Similarly, US biotechnology companies, which have made huge progress in innovation and push the boundaries of science, are routinely valued in the billions of dollars 15 often before they actually have any drugs for sale. If the market were really as short-termist as critics claim, that industry would not exist.
Conclusion
There continues today to be much criticism U.S. companies as too short-term oriented and not oriented enough towards innovation. The point of this paper is that this criticism is not new. There is a long history that goes back at least thirty-five years. If the short-term orientation
were true and such a bad thing, its effects should have shown up by now.
But none of those effects have appeared. A short-term orientation has not showed up in (lower) corporate profits. It has not shown up in (higher) VC investments and returns. It may have shown up in higher PE investment and returns in the past, but it does not appear to have been an issue in the last ten years. Finally, if it is a problem today, it should show up in (lower) current P/E Ratios. Instead, the opposite is true. Current P/E ratios are historically high.
Overall, then, the criticism of U.S. companies (and their managers) seems overstated if not unwarranted. 40% 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 
